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CURRENT LEGISLATION
then, perhaps it would be void only because the court said so. To
allow a defendant to commit legal suicide by urging that the instru-
ment under which he claims is void, and for the court to hold on
that ground that the plaintiff needs no relief, although his title is
seriously clouded in fact, is neither just nor reasonable." 23
It is evident, therefore, that the amendment to Section 500
which has just been enacted was not only desirable but necessary in
order that the uncertainties and inequities which are now prevalent,
might be finally resolved.
The procedure available under the new amendment is also ap-
plicable to outlawed vendors' liens as the problems inherent in such
liens are analogous to those presented by outlawed mortgages.24 The
vendor's lien contemplated by this statute is the lien implied by law
in favor of a vendor who has conveyed without taking security for
the purchase price and also the lien which is expressly reserved by
contract but which has not been raised to the dignity of a mortgage.20
The statute also provides that the interest of any mortgagee is
an "interest in real property," as that phrase is used in the statutory
proceeding and thus the remedy of cancellation is made available to
a junior mortgagee whose mortgage might become a first lien upon
cancellation of the outlawed mortgage. The remedy is also available
to a contract vendee who has not as yet taken a conveyance as the
statute likewise defines the interest of a contract vendee as an
"interest in real property." 26
HAROLD E. COLLINS.
AMENDMENT TO THE STOCK CORPORATION LAW RELATING TO
CERTIFICATES OF INCORPORATION REQUIRING MORE THAN STATU-
TORY MAJORITY FOR CORPORATE AcTIoN.-Effective September 1,
1948, the Stock Corporation Law has been amended by inserting a
new section to be Section 9.1 The amendment permits certificates
of incorporation to include therein provisions requiring more than a
statutory majority or plurality for a quorum vote or consent of di-
rectors or shareholders. Four specific limitations are placed upon
certificates of incorporation requiring mor& than the statutory ma-
jority. No such requirement will be deemed valid unless (1) it ap-
pears in the certificate as originally filed or as originally amended;
2338 Minn. 70, 71, 72, 35 N. W. 723, 724, 725 (1887).24 N. Y. LAW REVISION CommIssioN RF.PORT, LEGiS. Doc. No. 65(N)
(1948).
25 Franklin Savings Bank v. Ascension Memorial Church, - Misc. -, 55
N. Y. S. 2d 808 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
26N. Y. LAW REviSION COMMISSION REPrmT. LEGis. Doc. No. 65(N)
(1948).
1 Laws of N. Y. 1948, c. 862.
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(2) notice of its existence appears on the face of all stock certifi-
cates; (3) it specifies a period of duration no longer than ten years;
and (4) the certificate shall be subscribed and acknowledged by every
subscriber to stock if no stock has been issued.
Legislative action was prompted by the decision in Benintendi
v. Kenton Hotel.2 In that case two shareholders owning one-third
and two-thirds respectively of the corporate stock agreed to four
amendments to the by-laws requiring unanimous vote (1) for all
elections of directors, (2) for all shareholders' resolutions, (3) for
all directors' resolutions, and (.4) for all amendments of the by-laws
by shareholders. The court, in a divided decision, struck down the
first three by-laws as being inconsistent with the statutory scheme
of corporate government set up by the General Corporation Law8
and the Stock Corporation Law. 4
The principle that a requirement of unanimity for corporate ac-
tion may violate statutory requirements first appeared in New York
in Matter of Boulevard Theatre and Realty Co.5 There it was held
that a clause in the certificate of incorporation requiring unanimous
consent of stockholders to elect directors was in',contravention of
Section 55 of the General Corporation Law. That section provides
that directors shall be chosen "by a plurality of the votes."
In the Benintendi case the court applied the same reasoning to
unanimous resolutions by stockholders and directors. Since Section
27 of the Stock Corporation Law permits a corporation to enact a
by-law fixing "the number of directors necessary to constitute a
quorum at a number less than a majority of the board but not less
than one-third of its number," the conclusion, said the court, is
inescapable that a by-law requiring every action of the board to be
by unanimous vote is inconsistent with this section. The basic idea
of a "quorum" compels the conclusion that, when that required num-
ber of persons goes into session as a body the votes of a majority
thereof constitutes a sufficient number for binding action. Although
the second by-law violated no known decision or specific statute,
nevertheless it violated the legislative intent as manifested by the
statutory specification of the total vote percentages required to au-
thorize various types of corporate action.6
The minority opinion, however, argued that, as in this case,
where no rights of third persons are affected or public policy con-
2294 N. Y. 112, 60 N. E. 2d 829 (1945).
3 N. Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 27.
4 N. Y. STocx Cop. LAW § 55.
5 195 App. Div. 518, 186 N. Y. Supp. 430 (1st Dep't 1921), aff'd, 231 N. Y.
615, 132 N. E. 910 (1921).6 See N. Y. Stock Corp. Law §§ 36, 37, requiring an affirmative two-third
vote for changing the capitalization, and N. Y. Gen. Corp. Law §§,102, 103,
empowering the holders of a majority of the stock to dissolve the corporation
and giving the same power to holders of half the stock, if there be a deadlock
on the question of dissolution.
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travened, stockholders may agree to anything they wish. 7 It would
seem that this view is not at variance with well-reasoned opinion.
It has been held that the owners of 100% of the stock of a corpora-
tion may do with it what they will, even to the extent of giving it
away, provided the rights of creditors are not involved, and the public
policy of the state is not offended.8 While it is true that courts have,
at times, laid down various tests as determinative of the enforce-
ability of agreements which are admittedly illegal as by-laws, in the
final analysis damages suffered or threatened to someone should be
the sole criterion of enforceability. As pointed out in Clark v. Dodge,
".... if the enforcement of a particular contract damages nobody-
not even, in any perceptible degree, the public-one sees no reason
for holding it illegal, even though it impinges slightly upon the broad
provisions of Section 27. Damage suffered or threatened is a logical
and practical test, and has come to be the one generally adopted by
the courts." 9
In Little v. Garabrant 10 the court held that with the consent of
all the stockholders, and with no rights of creditors involved, the
corporate assets might be given away. Pursuing further this trend
of thought, it would seem that if funds are misapplied by directors
of a corporation, or converted to their own use, abuse of authority
as between the directors and the corporation may be cured by the
unanimous consent or ratification of the stockholders. To counte-
nance the practice of larceny and conversion by fiduciaries is strongly
in contravention of public policy, and yet unanimous consent or
ratification validates even such acts."1
It is to be noted that the Benintendi case dealt with a situation
where the controverted provisions were in the by-laws of the cor-
poration, whereas the Stock Corporation Law as amended by Sec-
tion 9 deals with certificates of incorporation. Although there has
been no decision following the Benintendi case specifically applying
the law as there set forth to a situation involving certificates of in-
7 Ripin v. U. S. Woven Label Co., 205 N. Y. 442, 98 N. E. 855 (1912).
8 Clark v. Dodge, 269 N. Y. 410, 199 N. E. 641 (1936) ; Matter of Ameri-
can Fibre Chair Seat Corp., 265 N. Y. 416, 193 N. E. 253 (1934). Courts have
constantly adverted to public policy arguments in holding agreements invalid,
when it is difficult to see where the public is involved, e.g., McQuade v. Stone-
ham, 263 N. Y. 323, 329, 189 N. E. 234, 236 (1934). But Cf. Lorillard v.
Clyde, 86 N. Y. 384, 389 (1881), where Judge Andrews, delivering the opinion
of the court, said, "I can see no objection on the score of public policy, to an
agreement between parties about to form a corporation, agreeing upon the
general plan upon which it is to be organized and conducted, so long as nothing
is provided for inconsistent with the provisions of the statute, or immoral in
itself."
9269 N. Y. 410, 415, 199 N. E. 641, 642 (1936), Note, 28 COL. L. Rav. 366,
372 (1928).
1090 Hun 404 (N. Y. 1895), aff'd, 153 N. Y. 661 (1897).
li MRAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRivATE CORPoRA oNs § 625
(2d ed. 1886).
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corporation, the reasoning in that case strongly indicated that the
courts would probably have followed the Benintendi ruling in such
later case. By making the amendment applicable to certificates of
incorporation only, the new legislation does not specifically rectify
the Benintendi decision. However, as the court in the latter case
based its statutory interpretation largely on the intent of the legis-
lature, if such a case were to come before the court today, it is pos-
sible that the intent of the legislature as set forth in the new Section
9, Stock Corporation Law, will be given effect as being directly in
point. On the other hand, it is possible that courts will place a limited
construction on the new section, holding that though such corporate
action is now possible, it is desirable that such requirements be placed
in the certificate of incorporation which, after all, is a document of
public record, whereas by-laws are not. This is suggested by the fact
that the legislature set forth certain specific limitations to the validity
of such requirements, as indicated above.
It is submitted that the new legislation will be of salutary effect.
The new Section 9 will enable one or more shareholders of a close
corporation, subject to certain statutory safeguards, to exercise some
form of veto power over the actions of directors or shareholders.
This may be accomplished by requiring either unanimity or ma-
jority vote greater than prescribed by statute, either for the taking
of any action or the taking of specific action. Then, too, the legisla-
ture by a clearly formulated policy, and by an unmistakable manifes-
tation of its intent in reference to close corporations, has probably
laid to rest much of the controversial matter evoked by the decision
of the Benintendi case.
ISADOR LIDDIE.
DISQUALIFICATION OF WITNESS AS TO TRANSACTIONS WITH
DECEDENT OR LUNATIc-RECENT EXCEPTION.-In 1948 the New
York Legislature further amended Section 347 of the Civil Practice
Act to provide that a party to an action may testify where the other
party has died, as to the facts of an accident and the results therefrom
where such accident arose out of the ownership or operation of an
airplane or vessel within the state.'
Thus the disqualification of a party or of one from through or
under whom the party derived his interest is relaxed once again by
our legislature. It would appear, therefore, that New York is gradu-
ally adopting a more liberal attitude towards such testimony whereas
previously a strict adherence to the rule of disqualification was in-
dicated. This state of the law as exhibited by the 1948 amendment
may be contrasted with the situation as it stood formerly. At early
'Laws of N. Y. 1948, c. 705.
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